We develop a semantics for logics of imperfect information with respect to general models.
Introduction
Logics of imperfect information are extensions of first-order logic (or, sometimes, of other logics: see for example Tulenheimo [13] and Väänänen [15] ) which allow to reason about patterns of dependence and independence between variables.
Historically, the earliest such logic was branching quantifier logic (Henkin [5] ), which adds to the language of first order logic branching quantifiers such as ∀x ∃y ∀z ∃w φ(x, y, z, w) whose interpretation, informally speaking, states that the choice of y is not dependent on the choice of z and the choice of w is not dependent on the choice of x. A significant breakthrough in the study of this class of logics occurred with the development of independence-friendly logic (Hintikka and Sandu [7] ), through which
1. The syntax of branching quantifier logic was significantly simplified, doing away with complex structures of quantifiers such as the above one and introducing instead slashed quantifiers (∃x/W )φ, whose informal interpretation is "there exists a x, not dependent on any variables in W , such that φ";
2. The game-theoretic semantics of logics of imperfect information was defined formally, and its properties were examined in detail.
These developments made it possible to define, in [8] , a compositional semantics for independence-friendly logic which is equivalent to its game-theoretic semantics. This semantics, called team semantics or trump semantics, differs from Tarski's semantics for first order logic in that satisfaction conditions of formulas are predicated not of single assignments, but of sets of assignments 1 (which we will henceforth call Teams, after the terminology of Väänänen [14] ).
This alternate semantics provided one of the main impulses towards the development of dependence logic [14] , which separates the notion of dependence and independence from the notion of quantification by doing away with slashed quantifier and introducing instead dependence atoms of the form =(t 1 . . . t n ), where t 1 . . . t n are terms, which are satisfied by a team X if and only if the value of t n is a function of the values of t 1 . . . t n−1 in it. This -only at first sight minor -innovation led to a number of significant advances in the study of the properties of logics of imperfect information, and, in particular, of their model theory; apart from the aforementioned [14] , we can refer here for example to the results of (Juha) Kontinen and Väänänen [10] and (Jarmo) Kontinen [9] .
Furthermore, a recent direction of research in the field of logics of imperfect information consists in the study of the model-theoretical properties of variants of dependence logic obtained by substituting the dependence atoms with other kinds of non first-order atomic formulas. The earliest work along these lines was Grädel and Väänänen [4] , whose independence logic is expressively stronger than dependence logic and will be the main logical formalism taken in exam in the rest of this work; furthermore, we have multivalued dependence logic from Engström [2] and inclusion logic and exclusion logic from Galliani [3] . 2 One property common to all these papers is that they are essentially concerned only with the semantics of logics of imperfect information and its modeltheoretic properties. The corresponding proof theories, instead, are still relatively undeveloped. The recent [11] presents a sound and complete deduction system for extracting the first-order consequences of a Dependence Logic theory; however, due to the equivalence between Dependence Logic and existential second-order logic there exists no hope of extending this system to one for deducing the Dependence Logic consequences of a Dependence Logic theory according to the standard semantics. The present paper, drawing inspiration from Henkin's treatment of second order logic [6] and from the analysis of branching quantifiers of [12] , may be seen as a different approach to the study of the proof theories of logics of imperfect information: instead of restricting our language, we will weaken the semantics and consider a more general class of models and then we will develop a proof system capable of extracting all valid formula for this new semantics.
Independence Logic
In this section, we will briefly recall the syntax and the semantics of Independence Logic, plus a few of its basic properties. It can be safely skipped by anyone who is already familiar with the results of [4] .
As is often done in the field of logics of imperfect information, we will assume that our expressions are always in Negation Normal Form. The next definition will be useful to give the semantics for the "lax" (in the sense of [3] ) version of the existential quantifier that we will use: 
TS-∃ φ is ∃xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNF Σ and there exists a team
TS-∀ φ is ∀xψ for some suitable x and M |= X[M/x] ψ, where
As [4] shows, the dependence atom =(t 1 . . . t n ) is equivalent to the independence atom t n ⊥ t1...tn−1 t n . Therefore, Dependence Logic is contained in Independence Logic. The following result is also in [4] : 
where Rel(X) = {s( v) : s ∈ X}.
In [3] , the converse of this result is proved: 
for all models M with signature Σ and all nonempty teams X over M with domain V .
General models for independence logic
In this section, we will develop a generalization of team semantics, along the lines of Henkin's treatment of second order logic. As we will see, the fact that Independence Logic corresponds to Existential Second Order Logic (and not to full Second Order Logic) means that we will be able to restrict ourselves to consider only a very specific kind of general model. 
Proof:
Let Dom(X) = { x}, let R = Rel(X), and consider the formula φ( x, y) = ∃yR( x). Then take any assignment s with domain { x, y}: by construction,
We can easily adapt the team semantics of the previous section to general models. We report all the rules here, for ease of reference; but the only differences between this semantics and the previous one are in the cases PTS-∨ and PTS-∃. GTS-ind φ is t 2 ⊥ t1 t 3 for some tuples of terms t 1 , t 2 and t 3 , and for all s, s ′ ∈ X with t 1 s = t 1 s ′ there exists a s ′′ ∈ X with t 1 t 2 s ′′ = t 1 t 2 s and
GTS-∃ φ is ∃xψ for some variable x and some ψ ∈ NNF Σ and there exists a team
The usual semantics for Independence Logic satisfies a locality principle: in brief, the satisfiability of a formula φ in a team depends only on the restriction of the team to Free(φ). Let us verify that the same holds for entailment semantics:
By definition, X | x is φ( x, R) M , where φ is ∃ y(R x y) and R = Rel(X). Therefore, X | x ∈ G. 
The proof is by structural induction on φ. We present only the passages corresponding to disjunction and existential quantification, as the others are trivial: Therefore (M, G) |= X ∃xψ, as required.
As in the case of Second Order Logic, first-order models can be represented as a special kind of general model: How does the satisfaction relation in general team semantics change if we vary the set G? The following definition and result give us some information about this:
Intuitively speaking, a refinement of a general model is another general model with more teams than it. The following result shows that refinements preserve satisfaction relations:
, let X ∈ G, and let φ be a formula over the signature of M with Free(φ) ⊆ Dom(X). Then
The proof is an easy induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal, the result is obvious, as the choice of the set of teams G (or G ′ ) does not enter into the definition of satisfaction condition PTS-lit.
2. If φ is an independence atom, the result is also obvious, for the same reason.
But Y and Z are also in G ′ , and by induction hypothesis we have that (M,
′ is also in G ′ , and by induction hypothesis (M, G ′ ) |= X ′ ψ, and finally (M, G ′ ) |= X ∃xψ.
This result shows us that, as was to be expected from the equivalence between independence logic and existential second order logic, if we are interested in formulas which hold in all general models over a certain first-order model we only need to pay attention to the smallest (in the sense of the refinement relation) ones. But do such "least general models" exist? As the following result shows, this is indeed the case: 
Let φ(x 1 . . . x n , m, R) be a first order formula with parameters, where each R i is of the form Rel(X) for some X ∈ ∩ i G i . Then the team φ(x 1 . . . x n , m, R) M is in G i for all i ∈ I, and therefore it is in i∈I G, as required. Therefore, it is indeed possible to talk about the least general model over a first order model. 
What is the purpose of least general models? The answer comes as a consequence of Theorem 3.9, and can be summarized by the following corollary:
Corollary 3.12 Let Σ be a first order signature, let M be a first order model over it and let (M, L) be the least general model over it. Then, for all teams X ∈ L and all formulas φ with signature Σ and with free variables in Dom(X),
Suppose that (M, L) |= X φ. Then take any general model (M, G): by definition, we have that (M, L) ⊆ (M, G), and hence by Theorem 3.9 we have that (M, G) |= X φ.
Conversely, suppose that (M, G) |= X φ for all general models (M, G); then in particular (M, L) |= X φ, as required.
We can also find a more practical characterization of this "least general model". Proof:
′ ( x, m, n 1 , . . .), and therefore
as required.
As long as we are only considering teams in L, studying satisfiability with respect to the least model (M, L) is the same as considering satisfiability with respect to all general models over M . This restriction may at first sight seem a bit unpractical, but it becomes irrelevant when it comes to the problem of validity: Definition 3.14 (Validity wrt general models) Let Σ be a first order signature, let V be a finite set of variables, and let φ ∈ NNF Σ be a formula of our language with free variables in V . Then φ is valid with respect to general models if and only if (M, G) |= X φ for all general models (M, G) with signature Σ and for all teams X ∈ G with Dom(X) ⊇ Free(φ). If this is the case, we write GTS |= φ. 
is also a general model. Then, the result is proved by observing that the truth conditions of our semantics depend only on the interpretations of the symbols in the signature of the formula (and on the choice of G, of course).
Lemma 3.17 Let (M,
G) be a general model with signature Σ, let S ∈ Σ be a new relation symbol and letX ∈ G. Furthermore, let M ′ = M [Rel(X)/S] be the extension of M to the signature Σ ∪ {S} such that S M ′ = Rel(X). Then (M ′ , G) is a general model.
Proof:
Let φ( x, m, R) be a first order formula with signature Σ ∪ {S} and parameters m and R, where each R i is Rel(X i ) for some X i ∈ G. Then let φ ′ ( x, m, R, S) be the first order formula with signature Σ, where S now stands for the relation Rel(X). Now clearly
Theorem 3.18 A formula φ is valid wrt general models if and only if it is valid wrt least general models.

Proof:
The left to right direction is obvious. For the right to left direction, suppose that LTS |= φ, let (M, G) be a general model whose signature contains the signature of φ, and let X ∈ G be a team whose domain {x 1 . . . x n } contains all free variables of φ. Then consider the first order model M ′ = M [Rel(X)/S], where S is a new relation symbol, and take the least general model (M ′ , L) over it. We clearly have that X ∈ L, since
and, therefore, (M ′ , L) |= X φ by hypothesis. Now, by Lemma 3.17, (M ′ , G) is a general model, and therefore by definition L ⊆ G, and hence by Theorem 3.9 (M ′ , G) |= X φ too. Finally, the relation symbol S does not occur in φ, and therefore by Lemma 3.16 (M, G) |= X φ, as required.
In the next section, we will develop another, more syntactic way of reasoning about least general models.
Entailment semantics
Let (M, L) be a least general model; then, as we saw, L is the set of all teams corresponding to first order formulas with parameters. Therefore, in order to reason about satisfaction in a least general team, there is no need to carry around sets of assignments; rather, we can use these first order formulas themselves as our context-carrying objects. In this section, we will develop this idea, building up a new "entailment semantics" and proving its equivalence with "least general model semantics".
In order to do all of this, we first need to be a bit more formal about the concept of "constant parameters". This is achieved through the following definitions: Parameter variables clarify the interpretation of such expressions such as M |= s γ( x, m): this is simply a shorthand M |= h∪s γ( x, p), where h is a parameter assignment with domain p and with h( p) = m. Team variables, instead, are going to be used in order to describe the variables in the domain of the team corresponding to a given first order expression: for any first order γ( x, p), where x are team variables and p are parameter variables, and for any h with domain p, we will therefore have γ( x, p) M,h = γ( x, h( p)) M = {s : Dom(s) = x, M |= h∪s γ}. For this reason, parameter variables will never occur in the domain of a team, and, hence, from this point on we will always assume that parameter variables never occur in independence logic formulas, but only in the first order team definitions.
After these preliminaries, we can now give our main definition for this section: 
ES-∃ φ is ∃x n ψ and there exist a parameter assignment h ′ extending h and a first order formula γ ′ with Free
ES-∀ φ is ∀x n ψ and there exists a parameter assignment h ′ extending h and a first order formula γ ′ with Free
Proposition 4.4 Let M be a first order model with signature Σ, let γ( x, p) be a first order formula with Free P (γ) = p and let h, h ′ be two parameter assignments with domains containing p such that
Proof:
The proof is a straightforward induction over φ.
As the next result shows, entailment semantics is entirely equivalent to least general model semantics: Theorem 4.5 Let Σ be a first order model, let γ( x, p) be a first order formula with Free P (γ) = p, let h be a parameter assignment with domain p and let φ ∈ NNF Σ be an independence logic formula with free variables in x.
Furthermore, let (M, L) be the least general model over M , and let
4 That is, Dom(h ′ ) ⊇ Dom(h), and h ′ ( p) = h( p).
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ, and presents no difficulties. 2. If φ is an independence atom, the result is also obvious, and follows at once from a comparison of the rules PTS-ind and ES-ind. 
Corollary 4.7 For all formulas φ, ENS |= φ if and only if LTS |= φ if and only if GTS |= φ
It will also be useful to have a slightly more general notion of validity in entailment semantics: 
Proof:
Suppose that ENS |= φ. Then in particular, for any model M whose signature contains that of φ and R we have that M |= R x φ, and hence |= R x φ.
Conversely, suppose that |= R x φ, let M be a first order model 5 , and let X ∈ L be any team with domain x. Let us then consider the model M ′ obtained by adding to M the | x|-ary symbol R with R
and therefore, as R occurs nowhere in φ, (M, L) |= X φ too. This holds for all X with domains x; therefore by the Locality Theorem (Theorem 3.5), the same holds for all domains containing x, and hence LTS |= φ. This implies that ENS |= φ, as required.
In the next section, we will develop a sound and complete proof system for this notion of validity with respect to a team definition.
The proof system
In this section, we will develop a proof system for Independence Logic (with entailment semantics) and prove its soundness and completeness. 
The intended semantics of a sequent is the following one:
The following result is then clear: Now, all we need to do is develop some syntactic rules for finding whether a given sequent is valid.
We can do this as follows:
Definition 5.4 (Axioms and Rules) The axioms of our proof system are
PS-lit If φ is a first order literal with no free parameter variables (that is,
PS-ind If t 1 , t 2 and t 3 are first order terms with no free parameter variables then
for all γ, where v 1 and v 2 are tuples of variables of the same lengths of
is the tuple obtained by substituting v with v j in t i , and the same holds for γ( v j ).
The rules of our proof system are
where, as in the previous case,
PS-depar If Γ | γ ⊢ φ and p is a parameter variable which does not occur free in γ then ∃p Γ | γ ⊢ φ; 
such that, for all i = 1 . . . n, Γ i | γ i ⊢ φ i is either an instance of PS-lit, PS-ind or it follows from {Γ j | γ j ⊢ φ j : j < i} through one application of the rules of our proof system. Given a proof P = S 1 . . . S n , where each S i is a sequent, we define its length |P | as n − 1, that is, as the number of sequents in the proof minus one.
Before examining soundness and completeness for this proof system, it will be useful to obtain a couple of derived rules:
The following rules hold:
PS-FO If φ is a first order formula with no free parameter variables
∀ v(γ → φ) | γ ⊢ φ is provable for all γ, where v = Free T (γ) ∪ Free T (φ);
PS-dep If t is a tuple of terms, t ′ is another term and =( t, t
is provable for all γ, where v 1 , v 2 are tuples of the same length of v =
where the last two passages hold because ∀ v(∃xγ ↔ ∃xγ) is valid and because ∀ v(γ → ∀xψ) entails ∀ v∀x((∃xγ) → ψ) in first order logic, where v = Free T (γ) ∪ Free T (ψ) (and, therefore, if x is free in γ then x is in v).
PS-dep By definition, =( t, t ′ ) stands for t ′ ⊥ t t ′ ; therefore, by rule PS-ind we have that
But the formula
entails the premise, and therefore by rule PS-ent we have our conclusion. 
Proof:
If S is a provable sequent then there exists a proof S 1 . . . S n S for it. Then we go by induction of the length n of this proof:
Base case Suppose that the proof has length 0. Then S is an instance of PS-lit or of PS-ind. Suppose first that it is the former, that is, that
for some first order γ and some first order literal φ, where v = Free T (γ) ∪ Free T (φ) and φ has no parameter variables. Now suppose that M |= h ∀ x(γ → φ); then, by definition, if s is an assignment over team variables such that M |= h∪s γ then M |= s φ. Therefore, by ES-lit, M |= γ(s) φ in entailment semantics, as required.
The case corresponding to PS-ind and ES-ind is entirely similar.
Induction case Let S 1 S 2 . . . S n S be our proof. For each i ≤ n we have that S 1 . . . S i is a valid proof for S i , and hence by induction hypothesis that S i is valid. Now let us consider which rule r was been used to derive S from S 1 . . . S n :
. By induction hypothesis, we can then find a Γ ′ such that
Then the following is a valid proof:
And, once again, the assignment h satisfies the antecedent of the last sequent, as required.
The completeness of our proof system follows from the above lemma and from the compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for First Order Logic: 
Since Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid, for any first order model M over the signature of Γ, γ and φ and for all h such that M |= h Γ we have that M |= γ(h) φ, and hence by the lemma that
Then consider the first order, countable 7 theory
This theory is unsatisfiable. Indeed, suppose that M 0 is a model that satisfies Γ under the assignment h 0 : then, by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, there exists a countable elementary submodel (
too, and therefore M 0 is not a model of T . By the compactness theorem, this implies that there exists a finite subset
Now, for each i, Γ Mi,hi | γ ⊢ φ can be proved. Therefore, by rule PS-split, we have that ( Γ M1,s1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ ( Γ Mn,sn ) | γ ⊢ φ is also provable; and finally, by rule PS-ent we can prove that Γ | γ ⊢ φ, as required.
Using essentially the same method, it is also possible to prove a "compactness" result for our semantics:
Theorem 5.10 Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid. Then there exists a finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ 0 | γ ⊢ φ is provable (and valid).
Let κ = max(|Γ|, ℵ 0 ), and consider the theory
where, as in the previous proof, Γ M,h is a finite theory such that M |= h Γ M,h and such that Γ M,h | γ ⊢ φ is provable in our system. Then T is unsatisfiable: indeed, if T had a model then it would have a model (M, h) of cardinality at most κ, and since that model would satisfy Γ it would satisfy Γ M,h too, which contradicts our hypothesis.
Hence, by the compactness theorem, there exists a finite set { Γ M1,h1 , . . . , Γ Mn,hn } and a finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that
But by rule PS-split, we have that Γ M1,h1 ∨. . .∨ Γ Mn,hn | γ ⊢ φ is provable, and hence by rule PS-ent Γ 0 | γ ⊢ φ is also provable, as required.
Adding more teams
The proof system that we developed in the previous section is, as we saw, sound and complete with respect to its intended semantics. However, this semantics is perhaps quite weak: all that we know is that the teams which correspond to parametrized first order formulas belong in our general models.
Rather than adding more and more axioms to our proof system in order to guarantee the existence of more teams, in this section we will attempt to separate our assumptions about team existence from our main proof system. This will allow us to modulate our formalism: depending on our needs, we may want to assume the existence of more or of less teams in our general model.
The natural language for describing assertions about the existence of relations is of course, existential second order logic. The following definitions show how it can be used for our purposes: Our proof system for Θ-closed general models can then be obtained by adding the following rule to our system: PS-Θ If Γ 1 ( S), Γ 2 | γ ⊢ φ is provable, where the relation symbols S do not occur in Γ 2 , in γ or in φ, and ∃ R Γ 1 ( R) is in Θ for some R then Γ 2 | γ ⊢ φ is provable.
Theorem 6.4 (Soundness) Let Γ | γ ⊢ φ be a sequent which is provable in our proof system plus PS-Θ. Then it is Θ-valid.
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the length of the proof, and follows very closely the one given already. Hence, we only examine the case in which the last rule used in the proof is PS-Θ. Then, by induction hypothesis, we have that Γ 1 ( S), Γ | γ ⊢ φ is Θ-valid for some Γ 1 and some S which does not occur in Γ, in γ or in φ, and moreover ∃ R Γ 1 ( R) is in Θ. Now, let (M, G) be any Θ-closed general model, and let us assume without loss of generality that the relation symbols in S are not part of its signature. Furthermore, let h be a parameter assignment (with domain Free(Γ) ∪ Free(γ)) such that M |= h Γ. By definition, there exists a tuple of teams X ∈ G such that M |= Γ 1 [ Rel( X)/ S]. Now let M ′ be M [ Rel( X)/ S]: since X is in G, it is not difficult to see that (M ′ , G) is a general model. Furthermore, it is Θ-closed, M ′ |= Γ 1 , and M ′ |= h Γ. Hence, (M ′ , G) |= γ h φ; but since the relation symbols S do not occur in γ or in φ, this implies that (M, G) |= γ h φ.
In order to prove completeness, we first need a definition and a simple lemma. 
Consider any ∃ Rθ( R) ∈ Θ. Then M |= θ( S i ), for some tuple of relation symbols S i in the signature of M . Then, the teams X associated to the corresponding relations are in L, and for these teams we have that M |= θ[ Rel( X)/ R], as required.
Theorem 6.7 (Completeness) Suppose that Γ | γ ⊢ φ is Θ-valid. Then it is provable in our proof system plus PS-Θ.
Let M be any first order model satisfying Θ F O , where we assume that the relation symbols used in the construction of Θ F O do not occur in Γ, in γ or in φ. Then, by the lemma, (M, L) is Θ-closed, and this implies that, for all assignments h such that M |= h Γ, M |= γ h φ.
Therefore, Θ F O , Γ | γ ⊢ φ is valid; and hence, for some finite ∆ ⊆ Θ F O it holds that ∆, Γ | γ ⊢ φ is provable. Now we can get rid of ∆ through repeated applications of rule PS-Θ and, therefore, prove that Γ | γ ⊢ φ, as required.
